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1 Introduction
This paper contributes to the emerging equilibrium search literature that considers non-
stationary firm wage policies to analyse wage distributions and labour market transitions.
Using a model somewhat similar to Stevens (2004), I show that there exists an equilibrium
in which firms oﬀer contracts conditional upon workers’ initial experience and employment
status for reasons other than productivity. In this equilibrium firms compete for workers using
promotion contracts. The distribution of outside oﬀers for each experience level is described
by two mass points, one for each employment status. Firms oﬀer “bad” jobs with longer time-
to-promotion periods to unemployed workers and “good” jobs with shorter ones to employed
workers. Turnover occurs in the direction of bad towards good jobs. Furthermore, outside
oﬀers are disperse across experience levels and become more generous with experience for
employed workers.
The main novelty of the paper is to provide a new foundation for equilibrium wage disper-
sion among ex-ante similar agents. Dispersion in contract oﬀers is generated by considering
experience and employment status to be focal points. As discussed by Schelling (1960) and
Myerson (1997), focal points are exogenous characteristics that agents use to coordinate their
actions and achieve a particular equilibrium. They can be determined by societal norms, the
status quo, preplay communication, payoﬀ diﬀerentials or even seemingly trivial aspects. For
example, firms might expect other firms to contract upon experience and employment status
because of well established recruitment policies. In turn, these beliefs may imply all firms
contract upon them even though they do not aﬀect workers’ productivity.
In particular, the empirical evidence presented by Medoﬀ and Abraham (1980) and Man-
ning (2000) seems to suggest that firms do not necessarily contract upon experience and
employment status because of human capital reasons. Using personnel data of two US man-
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ufacturing companies, the former study shows that wages among jobs of the same diﬃculty
are positively correlated with workers’ initial experience even after controlling for produc-
tivity. On the other hand, Manning shows that a simple model of on-the-job search and job
displacement can explain around 50% of the observed experience-earnings profile without
relying on human capital explanations.1
In recent years equilibrium search models á la Burdett and Mortensen (1998) have become
increasingly popular due to their ability to provide a rich theory of wage dispersion and
turnover.2 In this framework, workers’ on-the-job search is a necessary condition to obtain
a continuous wage distribution. The implied dispersion in reservation wages among workers
enables identical firms to diﬀerentiate their wage policies while obtaining the same total
profits by trading-oﬀ profits per worker with the size of their labour force.3
However, this theory has been recently criticised in two important ways. First, bounding
firms to oﬀer a single wage is not profit maximising. It is precisely the possibility of continuous
job search that gives firms the incentive to deviate from oﬀering a constant wage. Given
no financial markets, the optimal contract is described by an upward sloping wage-tenure
profile. Stevens (2004) shows that in the case of risk neutral workers the optimal contract
can be characterised by a step-contract. She shows that when agents are homogeneous the
distribution of outside oﬀers degenerates to a single mass point at the reservation value of
unemployed workers, eliminating the eﬀects of workers’ on-the-job search.
1 Moreover, Manning (2003) uses the Displaced Worker Survey for the US and shows that the earnings losses
of these workers are positive correlated with experience, a prediction that contradicts the standard human
capital model. Similar evidence was also found by Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) using administrative
data for the state of Pennsylvania and by Burda and Mertens (2001) using the German Socioeconomic Panel.
2 From a theoretical point of view this theory provides an important contribution that eludes the so called
Diamond’s paradox. Diamond (1971) showed that in a wage posting game with identical agents where workers
search while unemployed there is no wage dispersion in equilibrium. The unique oﬀer distribution is described
by a single mass point at the common reservation wage. If search is costly, no matter how small the cost,
workers will not participate in the market.
3 An important literature has also been developed in testing these models empirically. See Van den Berg
(1999), Mortensen (2003) and Manning (2003) for recent surveys and interesting applications.
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A second critique comes from the assumptions made on the information available to the
firm when recruiting workers and when confronted with outside competition for its employees.
The Burdett and Mortensen framework assumes firms have no information about workers
other than their productivity and opportunity cost of employment. As a result firms always
oﬀer the same wage to any worker, missing out potential profits. Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2002) analyse the case of complete information and oﬀer-matching, in which firms perfectly
discriminate workers by their reservation wages. When agents are homogenous, workers are
eﬀectively oﬀered a step-contract with a random promotion date. The wage oﬀer distribution
is described by a mixture of two mass points: one at the common reservation wage and the
other at the worker’s marginal productivity. As in Stevens, no worker ever quits his employer
and firms are able to extract the entire match rents.
In the present paper firms pre-commit not to counter-oﬀer any outside oﬀers but ob-
serve workers’ experience and employment status when posting their contract oﬀers.4 As
mentioned earlier, in this case wage dispersion occurs within and between experience levels.
Moreover, firms obtain the same profits as in Stevens and Postel-Vinay and Robin. Hence,
this paper’s second main result is to shows that when firms use optimal contracts, changes in
their information set at the moment of recruiting can have strong eﬀects on wage dispersion
and turnover without changing the agents’ payoﬀs.
In a related paper, Burdett and Coles (2003) extend Stevens’ model and show that
if workers are risk averse and liquidity constraint, firms’ incentive to backload wages is
tempered by workers’ desire to smooth consumption over time. This trade-oﬀ implies an
4 Atkinson, Giles and Meager (1996) present evidence for the UK showing that firms have information on
these characteristics. Manning (2003) discusses why oﬀer-matching seems to be a relatively rare practice in
many labour markets, in particular in those of unskilled labour. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2004) developed a
model in which a firm’s choice to counteroﬀer is endogenously determined. They showed that under certain
conditions firms that oﬀer low-productivity jobs will not choose to counteroﬀer, while firms that oﬀer high
productivity jobs will.
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upward sloping and concave wage-tenure profile. A continuous wage distribution survives in
equilibrium for the same reasons as in Burdett and Mortensen.
The present paper diﬀers from theirs in several aspects. As in Burdett and Mortensen,
their model assumes firms have no information about workers. Second one of their aims is to
show that risk neutrality is determinant for Stevens’ degeneracy results. Adding risk aversion
to the present framework is not a trivial task and beyond the scope of this paper. To the
best of my knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to analyse recruitment and retention
strategies in a non-stationary equilibrium search environment in which firms have a coarse
information set about workers’ characteristics. Furthermore, given it delivers reasonable
empirical implications, I argue that this framework can be useful to study the eﬀects of
recruitment and retention policies on the distribution of wages observed within a firm and
analyse how search frictions can influence a firms’ internal wage structure.
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. The next sections describe the general frame-
work and the workers’ and firms’ decision problems. Section 5 shows that the optimal wage-
tenure contract is a step-contract for each level of initial experience and employment status.
Sections 6 and 7, define and construct the market equilibrium. Section 8 shows existence of
equilibrium. The last section further discusses the results and concludes.
2 Basic Framework
Consider a labour market in steady state in which time is continuous and there is a fixed
number of workers and firms each of measure one. Workers and firms are homogeneous in
that any firm generates revenue p for each worker it employs per unit of time.5 Workers can
either be employed (e) or unemployed (u) with experience, x, defined as total time spent in
5 In an earlier version, see Carrillo-Tudela (2004a), I consider the case in which productivity does increase
with experience and show that firms will still have incentives to condition their oﬀers on workers’ initial
experience to exploit their monopsony power.
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all previous employments. Firms post job oﬀers at a zero cost on a take it or leave it basis.
Both unemployed and employed workers of any experience search. Let 0 < λ < ∞ denote
the common Poisson arrival rate of these oﬀers. Assume there is no recall should a worker
quit or reject a job oﬀer.
A job oﬀer is described by a wage contract. Upon a meeting firms are able to observe
the worker’s experience and labour market status and condition their oﬀers upon these
characteristics. An important assumption is that firms pre-commit to pay the worker the
wages specified in the contract and not to counter-oﬀer any outside oﬀer the worker might
receive in the future. Contracts are then contingent on the worker’s tenure, t, defined as
time spent working on the firm. A job oﬀer is fully described by a wage-tenure contract
conditional on the worker’s initial experience and employment status.
An important simplification is that workers are liquidity constrained and cannot borrow
against future earnings. As in Stevens (2004) the lack of capital markets constrain the set
of feasible contracts available to the firm. In particular, they rule out contracts that require
entry fees or quitting payments from the worker. Formally, a wage contract is described by
a right-continuous function wxi defined for all tenures t given employment status i = u, e and
starting experience x such that it is bounded from below by w. It is useful to remember that
in this environment a firm is constrained to oﬀer the same wxi contract to any worker of type
i, x it meets.
Both agents have a zero rate of time preference. Firms are risk neutral and infinitely
lived. The objective of each firm is to maximize total steady state flow profits. Workers, on
the other hand, are also risk neutral but their lives are of uncertain duration. Any worker’s
life is described by an exponential random variable with parameter 0 < δ < ∞. The inflow
rate of new unemployed workers of zero experience into the market is δ. The objective of any
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worker is to maximize total expected lifetime utility. Finally, let b denote the opportunity
cost of employment per unit of time and assume p > b > w ≥ 0.
3 Worker’s Payoﬀs and Job Search Strategies
Given contact with a firm, a worker of employment status i and experience x observes the
posted contract wxi . Let V
x
i denote his expected lifetime utility conditional on accepting
it and using an optimal quit strategy in the future. Further, let Fi(V xi | x) denote the
distribution of starting payoﬀs oﬀered by firms to workers with employment status i and
experience x. Random matching implies, given contact with a firm, Fi(V xi | x) describes the
probability that the outside oﬀer has a value no greater than V xi . Although Fi(. | x) will be
endogenously determine in equilibrium, at this stage assume it is continuous in x and has
a bounded support. Let V xi and V
x
i denote the infimum and supremum of the support for
each i, x.
First consider the case of an unemployed worker. Let U(x) denote the expected lifetime
payoﬀ of this worker when he has experience x and follows an optimal search strategy.
Conditional on receiving a job oﬀer, the definition of U(x) and the no recall assumption
imply that his optimal policy is described by: accept a job oﬀer if and only if V xu ≥ U(x) and
reject a job oﬀer otherwise. Since workers do not accumulate experience while unemployed,
U(x) then solves the following stationary Bellman equation
δU(x) = b+ λ
Z V xu
U(x)
[V xu − U(x)]dFu(V xu | x). (1)
Now consider an employed worker who has been hired from state i with starting experi-
ence x on a wage contract wix. Define V xi (t;w
x
i ) as this worker’s expected lifetime payoﬀ at
tenure t when using an optimal quit strategy. Given any contract wxi and experience x + t
where V xi (t;w
x
i ) > U(x+ t), the definition of V
x
i (.;w
x
i ) and the no recall assumption implies
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the worker’s optimal strategy is to quit if and only if he receives a job oﬀer which has starting
value V x+te > V xi (t;w
x
i ) and continue employment at the firm if and only if V
x+t
e ≤ V xi (t;wxi ).
Since the worker gains experience while employed, V xi (.;w
x
i ) then satisfies the following non-
stationary Bellman equation
δV xi (t;w
x
i ) = w
x
i (t) +
dV xi (t;w
x
i )
dt
+ λ
Z V x+te
V xi (t;w
x
i )
[V x+te − V xi (t;wxi )]dFe(V x+te | x+ t), (2)
for i = u, e, and note that V xi (.;w
x
i ) is right-diﬀerentiable with respect to t at the point in
which wxi is discontinuous.
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However, if V xi (t;w
x
i ) < U(x + t) for some accumulated experience x + t, the worker’s
optimal strategy is to quit into unemployment. To allow for this possibility define the set
Υxi by
Υxi = {t ∈ <+ : V xi (t;wxi ) < U(x+ t)} for i = u, e
and let txi = inf Υ
x
i . Hence, t
x
i denotes the tenure at which an employed worker hired from
state i with initial experience x optimally quits into unemployment. If V xi (t;w
x
i ) ≥ U(x+ t)
for all t, then define txi =∞ and the worker never quits into unemployment.
Note that given a wage contract wxi and tenure t < t
x
i , a worker’s hazard rate is δ+λ[1−
Fe(V xi (t;w
x
i ) | x+ t)] for i = u, e. Hence, for tenures t < txi , the survival probability
ψxi (t;w
x
i ) = e
−
R t
0 [δ+λ(1−Fe(V xi (s;wxi )|x+s)]ds for i = u, e
describes the probability a newly employed worker hired from state i with starting experience
x does not leave the firm before tenure t. If txi <∞, then ψxi = 0 for all t ≥ txi and i = u, e.
6 See Van den Berg (1990)- Theorem 1 for a formal derivation of this equation and its properties.
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4 Firm Payoﬀs and Optimal Strategies
As firms can perfectly discriminate by employment status and previous experience, to simplify
the exposition consider for each employment status i = u, e the market of experience x.7
First lets analyse the market of unemployed workers with experience x. Define μ(x) as the
steady state number of unemployed workers with experience x. Consider a firm which posts
a contract wxu such that V xu denotes a worker’s expected lifetime payoﬀ by accepting it. If
V xu < U(x) the firm does not hire the worker and makes zero profit. However, if V xu ≥ U(x)
the firm’s steady state flow profit in this market is then given by
Ωxu(V
x
u , w
x
u) = λμ(x)
∙Z ∞
0
ψxu(t;w
x
u)[p− wxu(t)]dt
¸
,
where the first term describes the firm’s hiring rate and the second term the firm’s expected
profit per new hire. The firm’s total steady state flow profit in the market of unemployed
workers is then obtained by integrating Ωxu across all experience markets
Ωu(Wu) =
Z ∞
0
λμ(x)
∙Z ∞
0
ψxu(t;w
x
u)[p−wxu(t)]dt
¸
dx,
where Wu denotes the set of tenure contracts, wxu, the firm oﬀers to unemployed workers for
each experience x ≥ 0 such that V xu ≥ U(x).
Next, consider the market of employed workers with experience x. Let N(x) denote
the steady state number of employed workers that have experience no greater than x and
1 − G(V | x) denote the steady state proportion of employed workers that currently have
experience x and a lifetime expected payoﬀ of at least V.8 These two steady state measures
include workers that where hired from unemployment and from a competing firm. Consider
7 Note that at x = 0 the only oﬀer distribution that is defined is Fu(. | 0). As employed workers gain
x = 0+ experience firms have the possibility of hiring them from a competing firm and hence Fe(. | x) is
defined for all x > 0.
8 Given that workers’ lives follow a exponetial distribution, the N(x) is also exponentially distributed.
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a firm which posts a contract wxe such that V xe denotes a worker’s expected lifetime payoﬀ by
accepting it. Note G(V xe | x)dN(x) describes the steady state number of employed workers
of experience x that will accept the firms oﬀer. If V xe < U(x) the firm is certain not to hire
any worker and makes zero profit. If V xe ≥ U(x) the firm’s steady state flow profit in the
market of employed workers of experience x is then given by
Ωxe (V
x
e , w
x
e ) = λG(V
x
e | x)dN(x)
∙Z ∞
0
ψxe(t;w
x
e )[p− wxe (t)]dt
¸
.
The firm’s total steady state flow profit in the market of employed workers is obtained by
integrating Ωxe across experience markets
Ωe(We) =
Z ∞
0
λG(V xe | x)dN(x)
∙Z ∞
0
ψxe (t;w
x
e )[p− wxe (t)]dt
¸
dx,
where We denotes the set of tenure contracts, wxe , the firm oﬀers to employed workers for
each experience x > 0 such that V xe ≥ U(x).
Hence a firm’s total steady state profit flow is given by
Ω(Wu,We) = Ωu(Wu) + Ωe(We).
The objective of each firm is to choose two sets of wage contracts {Wu,We}, one for each
employment status, to maximise Ω(Wu,We) given Fu(. | x), Fe(. | x), U(x) for each market
x and the turnover strategies of workers described in the previous section.9 However, the
no recall assumption implies a firm can maximise total steady state profits by choosing Wi
independently to maximise Ωi(Wi) for each i = u, e. Furthermore, no recall also implies that
for a given i the firm can choose wxi to maximise Ω
x
i at each market x. This structure much
simplifies the analysis as it allows us to focus on the firm’s optimisation problem for each
pair i, x.10
9 Note that μ(x) and G(. | x) are functions of Fu(. | x) and Fe(. | x).
10 Without no recall, an employed worker hired with initial experience x0 might want to quit and be rehired
by the same firm in a future date because of a more attractive contract. Although a possibility in the decision
theory of a firm, I will show that in equilibrium this never happens.
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First, conditional on oﬀering a new hire a starting payoﬀ V xi ≥ U(x) an optimal contract
in market x solves the programming problem
max
wxi (.)≥w
Z ∞
0
ψxi (t;w
x
i )[p−wxi (t)]dt
subject to
V xi (0;w
x
i ) = V
x
i .
Let wx∗i (.;V
x
i ) denote this optimal contract and define Π
x∗
i (0;V
x
i ) as the expected profit
per new hire associated with it. The optimized steady state flow profit in the market of
unemployed workers of experience x is then given by
Ωx∗u (V
x
u , w
x∗
u ) = λμ(x)Π
x∗
u (0;V
x
u )
and the corresponding steady state flow profit in the market of employed workers of experi-
ence x is given by
Ωx∗e (V
x
e , w
x∗
e ) = λG(V
x
e | x)dN(x)Πx∗e (0;V xe ).
The firm then chooses V xi to maximise Ω
x∗
i . Let Ω
x
i denote the maximised value of Ωx∗i .
It follows that by integrating Ωxi across experience markets for each employment status we
obtain Ωi(Wi) for each i = u, e such that Ωu(Wu) +Ωe(We) = Ω(Wu,We).
5 Optimal Wage Contracts
5.1 The Contracting Problem
Given a match is formed at any market, search frictions provide the firm with a dynamic
monopsony power that enables it to extract quasi rents from the worker. The latter is able
to recover those rents (or part of them) over time through job shopping. Hence, in this
context quits are jointly ineﬃcient. As firms cannot eliminate potential quits and workers
are liquidity constraint, the optimal contract must then minimises the worker’s quit rate by
oﬀering him an increasing share of the match rents.
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In particular, when designing an optimal contract for a worker of employment status i
and initial experience x, each firm takes as given the distribution of outside oﬀers for each
pair i, x, the expected lifetime utility of unemployed workers and the optimal quit strategy
of employed workers. Formally, the firm’s optimal contracting problem is defined as
max
wxi (.)
Z ∞
0
ψxi (t)[p− wxi (t)]dt
subject to
dV xi (t)
dt
= δV xi (t)−wxi (t)− λ
Z V x+te
V xi (t)
£
V x+te − V xi (t)
¤
dFe(V x+te | x+ t)
dψxi (t)
dt
= − [δ + λ(1− Fe(V xi (t) | x+ t))]ψxi (t)
and the initial conditions
V xi (0) = V
x
i and ψ
x
i (0) = 1
and
wxi (.) ≥ w.
Let Jx(t) denote the maximum expected value of a match between a firm and an employed
worker of initial experience x at tenure t. Note Jx(t) also describes the expected lifetime
utility of a worker of tenure t and starting experience x that is paid wxi (t) = p for all t and
follows an optimal quit strategy. Such a contract is an optimal contract, it solves firm’s
maximisation problem conditional on V xi = J
x(0), and is the only one that guarantees that
the worker’s privately optimal quit strategy is also jointly eﬃcient. Using the same arguments
as in (2) we obtain that Jx(t) solves the following Bellman equation
δJx(t) = p+
dJx(t)
dt
+ λ
Z V x+te
Jx(t)
[V x+te − Jx(t)]dFe(V x+te | x+ t). (3)
However, since optimality implies no firm oﬀer a starting payoﬀ V xi > J
x(0) for any x ≥ 0,
as doing so yields negative profits, (3) can be reduced to Jx(t) = p/δ for all x, t ≥ 0.
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Also note that, conditional on workers earning expected lifetime payoﬀs belonging to
the set [U(x), Jx(0)), a firm can make strictly positive steady state profits in market i, x
by oﬀering a contract with a starting payoﬀ V xi ∈ [U(x), Jx(0)). Moreover, such a starting
payoﬀ is feasible for all x, t ≥ 0 since p > b and (1) imply Jx(t) > U(x+ t) for all x, t ≥ 0.
Hence without loss of generality lets assume that in the above optimisation problem a firm
conditions its contract on a starting payoﬀ V xi ∈ [U(x), Jx(0)).
The next claim follows Burdett and Coles (2003) and establishes boundary conditions for
the expected value of employment, V xi (.;w
x
i ) under an optimal contract.
CLAIM 1: Given an employment status i = u, e, any initial experience x ≥ 0, any profile
Fe(. | κ) and Fu(. | κ) for κ ≥ x and conditional on a V xi ∈ [U(x), Jx(0)), an optimal
contract implies U(x+ t) ≤ V xi (t;wx∗i ) ≤ Jx(t) for all t > 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
An important corollary of Claim 1 is that no worker employed in an optimal contract
will quit into unemployment. Hence, txi =∞ for all x, t and i = u, e in an optimal contract.
5.2 Step-Contracts
Since Fi(. | x) might have mass points at any x, standard dynamic optimisation techniques
cannot be applied to obtain necessary or suﬃcient conditions that could help characterise the
optimal contract. However, we can use similar arguments as in Stevens (2004). Given the
worker is risk neutral and hence there is no gain in smoothing income, Proposition 1 shows
that for an employment status i and experience x a step-contract is an optimal contract.
In particular, a step-contract is fully characterised by a promotion tenure z and wages paid
satisfy:
wxi (t) = w for t < z,
wxi (t) = p for t ≥ z;
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and the promotion tenure z is chosen so that the value of accepting the contract is V xi .
PROPOSITION 1: Given an employment status i = u, e, any initial experience x ≥ 0,
any profile Fe(. | κ) and Fu(. | κ) for κ ≥ x and conditional on a V xi ∈ [U(x), Jx(0)), a
step-contract is an optimal contract.
Proof: See Appendix.
Note that as long as V xi (t;w
x
i ) < J
x(t) for some t, any contract wxi generates ineﬃcient
quit behaviour, where a quit is jointly ineﬃcient if the outside oﬀer has value V x+te < Jx(t).
The proof of Proposition 1 relies on showing that a step-contract maximises the expected
profit per new hire by simply maximising the growth rate of V xi (t;w
x
i ) and hence minimising
the deadweight loss caused by ineﬃcient quit behaviour.
The step-contract property is useful as a firm’s optimal contract for each i, x is now fully
described by a singleton, zxi . The worker quits if an outside oﬀer that promises an earlier
promotion date is received. To simplify the analysis, consider the following re-normalisation.
Let an employed worker be hired from state i with initial experience x. Define T xi = x+ z
x
i
as the accumulated experience when promotion arrives. Note that the step-contract oﬀer
zxi is equivalent to promotion when the worker’s accumulated experience x + t reaches T
x
i .
This re-normalisation is convenient since outside oﬀers are conditioned on experience. A
worker then quits if and only if he receives an outside oﬀer at experience x0 < T xi , where the
corresponding promotion oﬀer T x
0
e = x0 + zx
0
e satisfies T x
0
e < T xi .
As discussed by Stevens (2004), equilibrium can imply there is a continuum of equilibrium
contracts which are payoﬀ equivalent to a step-contract.11 However, given a step-contract
is always optimal and is strictly optimal if some firms oﬀer a starting payoﬀ V xi > J
x(0) (as
would be the case with heterogenous firms), there is no loss in generality to only consider
11 With risk neutrality there is a continuum of payoﬀ equivalent contracts for t ≥ z, each of which implies
the worker never quits and that V xi (t, .) = p/δ. For example the firm could pay wxi (t) = 0 for t ∈ [z, z0] and
wxi (t) = wH > p for t > z0 where z0 and wH are chosen so that V xi (t, .) = p/δ for all t ≥ z.
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equilibrium in step-contracts.
6 Market Equilibrium
Given step-contracts as described in the previous section, lets define the following notation.
Let Vi(x, T xi ) denoted the expected value of an employed worker hired from state i = u, e
with experience x on a step-contract T xi ; i.e. the worker will be promoted after z
x
i = T
x
i − x
further units of time (if the worker does not quit). Let Πi(x, T xi ) denote the corresponding
firm’s expected profit. For workers of employment status i and experience x, the distribution
of oﬀers is described by Fi(T xi | x), where Fi(. | x) describes the probability that an outside
oﬀer implies promotion at accumulated experience no greater than T xi . Let T
x
i and T
x
i be the
infimum and supremum of the support for each i, x. Note that oﬀers always satisfy T xi ≥ x.
Also, conditional on experience x ≥ 0, let 1−G(T xi | x) denote the proportion of employed
workers on a step-contract of at least T xi .
In the market for unemployed workers of experience x, a firm then oﬀers T xu to maximise
expected steady state flow profit
Ωxu(T
x
u ) = λμ(x)Πu(x, T
x
u ). (4)
Similarly, in the market of employed workers with experience x, a firm oﬀers T xe to maximise
expected steady state flow profit
Ωxe(T
x
e ) = λ[1−G(T xe | x)]dN(x)Πe(x, T xe ). (5)
DEFINITION: A Market Equilibrium in step-contracts requires:
(a) an employed worker (x, T xe ) quits if an outside oﬀer T x
0
e < T xe is received;
(b) optimal job search by unemployed workers of experience x, where
δU(x) = b+ λ
Z Txu
Txu
max[Vu(x, T xu )− U(x), 0]dFu(T xu | x),
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and an unemployed worker with experience x accepts oﬀer T xu if and only if Vu(x, T xu ) ≥
U(x).
(c) μ(x) and G(. | x) are consistent with the distribution of contract oﬀers Fi(. | x) and
the optimal quit turnover strategies for each i, x;
(d) steady state flow profits satisfy
Ωxi (T
x
i ) = Ω
x
i for all T
x
i in the support of Fi(. | x),
≤ Ωxi otherwise, for i = u, e.
Consider an equilibrium where outside oﬀers are deterministic for each pair i, x.12 Note
that Claim 1 implies once an unemployed worker with no previous experience is hired, he
will not quit into unemployment at any positive experience. Hence μ(x) = 0 for all x > 0
and μ(0) = δ/(δ+λ) describes the equilibrium unemployment rate. Let T 0∗u denote the equi-
librium contract oﬀered to unemployed workers and T ∗e (x) denote the equilibrium contract
oﬀered to an employed worker with experience x > 0.13 Optimality implies T ∗e (x) < T 0∗u for
experiences x < T 0∗u . Otherwise the oﬀer is rejected by workers hired from unemployment
and the firm makes zero profit.
Let T ∗e have the following properties:
A1: For x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ), T ∗e is continuously diﬀerentiable with
(a) T ∗e (0) = T < T 0∗u ,
(b) it is strictly increasing with T ∗e (x) > x, and
(c) limx→T0∗u T
∗
e (x) = T 0∗u .
12 Although an equilibrium with non-degenerate and continuous outside oﬀers may exist, it is not trivial
to construct one. It can be shown that if Fu(. | 0) is assumed continuous with connected support
h
T 0u, T
0
u
i
,
the profile Fe(. | x) around x = 0 must be degenerate. By constructing a candidate equilibrium in which all
Fe(. | x) defined for x < T 0u are degenerate it can be shown using a contradiction argument that the only
Fu(. | 0) consistent with the profile Fe(. | x) is degenerate at T 0u.
13 Note that T ∗e (x) ≡ Tx∗e .
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Hence, in equilibrium firms oﬀer two type of jobs. A “bad” job -T 0∗u contracts- to un-
employed workers of zero experience and “good” jobs -T ∗e contracts- to employed workers.
Only those workers hired under T 0∗u contracts quit to firms that oﬀer T ∗e contracts. Given
T ∗e (x) is increasing in x, once a worker is hired under a T ∗e contract he stays in that firm
until retirement.
However, to fully characterise equilibrium we need to obtain the optimal promotions
oﬀered to potential unemployed workers of positive experience and determine U(x) for x ≥ 0.
Let T ∗u (x) denote the equilibrium contract firms oﬀer to any potential unemployed worker
with experience x ≥ 0 and note that T ∗u (0) = T 0∗u . After solving for a T ∗e and T 0∗u such that
A1 is satisfied, the solutions of T ∗u (x) and U(x) for all x ≥ 0 are described. It is then easy
to show that Claim 1 is indeed satisfied. As mentioned in the introduction, note that for
each experience x ∈
¡
0, T 0∗u
¢
the distribution of contract oﬀers is then define by a mixture of
two mass points, T ∗u (x) and T ∗e (x). Finally I show existence of equilibrium and analyse some
comparative statics by numerically solving the model.
7 Identifying a Market Equilibrium
7.1 Outside Oﬀers for Employed Workers
Given workers’ optimal search strategies, the properties of T ∗e as described by A1 and that at
market x = 0 it is optimal to oﬀer T 0∗u to unemployed workers, lets now characterise outside
oﬀers T ∗e (x) for all x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ). This is done by showing T ∗e (x) maximises steady state flow
profits for each x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ). For simplicity assume w = 0.
Step 1: Consider any market x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ). We start by characterising G and Πe. The next
claim derives 1 − G(T xi | x), the equilibrium distribution of employed worker’s reservation
values.
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CLAIM 2: At any experience x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ) :
1−G(T 0∗u | x) = e−λx
and for T xe ∈ (T , T 0∗u ) :
∂G(T xe | x)/∂T xe = 0, [1−G(T xe | x)] = e−λx for x < κ,
∂G(T xe | x)/∂T xe = λe−λκ/[dT ∗e (κ)/dx], [1−G(T xe | x)] = e−λκ for x > κ,
,where κ is defined by T ∗e (κ) = T xe .
Proof: See Appendix.
Next consider any market x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ) in which a firm oﬀers T xe ∈ (T , T 0∗u ). Similarly,
define κ where T xe = T ∗e (κ) and suppose x < κ. Conditional on hiring a worker with such a
contract, A1 implies the firm’s expected profit is:
Πe(x, T xe ) =
Z κ
x
e−(λ+δ)(s−x)pds+ e−(λ+δ)(κ−x)
Z Txe
κ
e−δ(s−κ)pds
=
p
λ+ δ
h
1− e−(λ+δ)(κ−x)
i
+ e−(λ+δ)(κ−x)
p
δ
h
1− e−δ(Txe −κ)
i
if x < κ,
as the worker quits for experiences x+ s < κ, does not quit thereafter, and the firm makes
zero profit for experiences x + s ≥ T xe . Now suppose x > κ. The firm’s expected profit
(conditional on a hire and A1) is
Πe(x, T xe ) =
Z Txe
x
e−δ(s−x)pds =
p
δ
h
1− e−δ(Txe −x)
i
if x > κ,
as the worker never quits to an outside oﬀer. Diﬀerentiating with respect to T xe and some
re-arranging establishes the following result.
CLAIM 3: At any experience x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ) and for T xe ∈ (T , T 0∗u ) :
∂Πe
∂T xe
= e−(λ+δ)(κ−x)
"
−
λpδ
£
1− e−δ(Txe −κ)
¤
dT ∗e (κ)/dx
+ pe−δ(T
x
e −κ)
#
for x < κ,
∂Πe
∂T xe
= pe−δ(T
x
e −x) for x > κ,
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where κ is defined by T ∗e (κ) = T xe .
A marginal increase in T xe increases expected profit by the marginal revenue product of
the worker at experience T xe , p, multiplied by the probability that he remains employed at
the firm until promotion date T xe . The loss, however, is that the worker is more likely to quit.
In this case the firm (conditional on the worker receiving an outside oﬀer) looses the profits
that otherwise would have obtain from delaying the worker’s promotion date.
Step 2: Fix an x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ) and recall a firm’s steady state flow profit by oﬀering contract
T xe ∈ (T , T 0∗u ) is given by (5). Note that neither marginal profit ∂Πe/∂T xe nor the density
function ∂G/∂T xe are continuous at T xe = T ∗e (x). Hence, in what follows consider left and
right diﬀerentiation.
(a) Right diﬀerentiation: consider T xe ∈ (T ∗e (x), T 0∗u ). Claims 2 and 3 imply
∂Ωxe
∂T xe
= −λ ∂G
∂T xe
dN(x)Πe(x, T xe ) + λ[1−G(T xe | x)]dN(x)
∂Πe
∂T xe
= λe−λxe−(λ+δ)(κ−x)
"
−λ
δ
p
£
1− e−δ(Txe −κ)
¤
dT ∗e (κ)/dx
+ pe−δ(T
x
e −κ)
#
dN(x).
Hence a necessary condition for optimality is that limε→0+ [∂Ωe(T ∗e+ε, x)/∂T xe ] ≤ 0, otherwise
oﬀering a T xe > T ∗e (x) is optimal. This implies
− λ
dT ∗(x)/dx
p
δ
h
1− e−δ(T∗e (x)−x)
i
+ pe−δ(T
∗
e (x)−x) ≤ 0.
(b) Left diﬀerentiation: consider T xe ∈ (T , T x∗e (x)). Claims 2 and 3 imply
∂Ωxe
∂T xe
= −λ ∂G
∂T xe
dN(x)Πe(x, T xe ) + λ[1−G(T xe | x)]dN(x)
∂Πe
∂T xe
= λe−λκ
"
−λ
δ
p
£
1− e−δ(Txe −x)
¤
dT ∗e (κ)/dx
+ pe−δ(T
x
e −x)
#
dN(x).
Hence a necessary condition for optimality is that limε→0+ [∂Ωe(T ∗e−ε, x)/∂T xe ] ≥ 0, otherwise
oﬀering a T xe < T ∗e (x) is optimal. This implies
− λ
dT ∗e (x)/dx
p
δ
h
1− e−δ(T∗e (x)−x)
i
+ pe−δ(T
∗
e (x)−x) ≥ 0.
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It follows that these conditions are satisfied if and only if T ∗e is the solution to the non-
autonomous diﬀerential equation
dT ∗e (x)
dx
=
λ
δ
p
£
1− e−δ(T∗e (x)−x)
¤
pe−δ(T∗e (x)−x)
=
λ
δ
h
eδ(T
∗
e (x)−x) − 1
i
(6)
for all x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ), subject to the initial condition T ∗e (0) = T . The fundamental theorem of
diﬀerential equations imply such a T ∗e exists, is continuously diﬀerentiable in x and strictly
increasing if x < T ∗e (x). Note that A1 also requires limx→T 0∗u T
∗
e (x) = T 0∗u . As in any initial
value problem, the stability of T ∗e and hence the existences of a fixed point T 0∗u depends on
the value of the initial condition, T ∗e (0) = T .
Recall z∗e(x) = T ∗e (x)− x denote the corresponding promotion tenure oﬀered to a worker
with experience x. In this case (6) can be expressed as,
dz∗e(x)
dx
=
λ
δ
h
eδz
∗
e (x) − 1
i
− 1,
which must be solved subject to the boundary condition z∗e(0) = T . The corresponding phase
diagram implies that
(a) if T < (1/δ) log[1 + δ/λ], then z∗e is strictly decreasing for all x. Since z∗e(x) → 0,
T ∗e (x)→ T 0∗u as x→ T 0∗u and T 0∗u > 0 is determined where z∗e(T 0∗u ) = 0 (which exists).
(b) if T ≥ (1/δ) log[1+ δ/λ], then z∗e is non-decreasing and a T 0∗u where z∗e(T 0∗u ) = 0 does
not exist.
Hence we have established the following Proposition.
PROPOSITION 2: A necessary condition for a market equilibrium with T ∗e satisfying A1
requires:
(a) T ∈ (0, T 1), where T 1 = (1/δ) log[1 + δ/λ].
(b) conditional on such a T , T ∗e is the solution to the diﬀerential equation (6) with initial
value T ∗e (0) = T ,and
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(c) T 0∗u is determined where dT ∗e (x)/dx = 0.
Note (6) describes how outside oﬀers for employed workers must vary with experience in
a market equilibrium. Under the conditions stated in Proposition 2 these oﬀers become more
generous with experience. The oﬀered promotion tenure, z∗e(x) = T ∗e (x)− x, decreases with
x. Since z∗e(x) > 0 for all x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ), (6) implies T ∗e is strictly increasing in x for x < T 0∗u .
Hence a solution to the conditions of Proposition 2 yields a T ∗e which satisfies A1. However
note that there exists many T ∗e that satisfy this requirement, each of them indexed by an
initial condition T ∈ (0, T 1).
The next claim shows that a T ∗e satisfying Proposition 2 implies firms are indiﬀerent to
increase (marginally) their promotion date T ∗e (x) at any market x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ). Thus, when
posting a contract T ∗e (x) at any market x > 0 firms trade oﬀ a longer period during which
they make positive profit with a higher chance the worker will quit in the future.
CLAIM 4: Given a T ∗e satisfying Proposition 2, then
∂Ωxe
∂T xe
= 0 for all T xe ∈ (T ∗e (x), T 0∗u );
∂Ωxe
∂T xe
> 0 for all T xe ∈ (T , T ∗e (x)).
Proof: See Appendix.
7.2 Workers’ Expected Payoﬀs
Given that at market x = 0 it is optimal for firms to oﬀer T 0∗u and that at markets x > 0 firms’
optimal contract oﬀers are described by any T ∗e satisfying Proposition 2, we now compute
the worker’s expected payoﬀs. First, fix a step-contract T ∗e (κ) ∈ (T , T 0∗u ). Only workers that
where hired from unemployment who quit with experience κ are employed on this contract.
Consider such a worker and with no loss of generality consider experience x ≥ κ. Noting that
T ∗e (x) > T ∗e (κ) for all x > κ implies the worker never quits, the worker’s expected lifetime
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payoﬀ is:
Ve(x, T ∗e (κ)) = e
−δ(T∗e (κ)−x)
Z ∞
T∗e (κ)
e−δ(s−T
∗
e (κ))pds = e−δ(T
∗
e (κ)−x) p
δ
,
as the worker receives a zero wage until promoted, and earns marginal revenue product
thereafter.
Now consider the expected payoﬀ of a worker employed under contract T 0∗u , the least
generous contract. The expected lifetime payoﬀ at experience x < T 0∗u is
Vu(x, T 0∗u ) = λ
Z T 0∗u
x
e−(λ+δ)(s−x)Ve(s, T ∗e (s))ds+ e
−(λ+δ)(T 0∗u −x)
Z ∞
T 0∗u
e−δ(s−T
0∗
u )pds,
=
p
δ
"
λ
Z T 0∗u
x
e−(λ+δ)(s−x)e−δ(T
∗
e (s)−s)ds+ e−(λ+δ)(T
0∗
u −x)
#
, (7)
where Ve(s, T ∗e (s)) = (p/δ)e−δ(T
∗
e (s)−s) is the starting payoﬀ oﬀered by a contract T ∗e at
market s ∈ (x, T 0∗u ). Under this contract the worker also gets paid a zero wage until promotion
and marginal revenue product thereafter, but before promotion arrives (which happens after
T 0∗u − x units of time) he might quit to a contract T ∗e (s) and receive Ve(s, T ∗e (s)).
Finally, consider an unemployed worker of experience x. In general, the expected value
of unemployment is given by
δU(x) = b+ λmax [Vu(x, T ∗u (x))− U(x), 0] for all x ≥ 0, (8)
where T ∗u (x) is the equilibrium contract firms oﬀer to unemployed workers of experience x.
7.3 Outside Oﬀers for Unemployed Workers
Given workers’ expected payoﬀ, we now determine T ∗u (x) for all x < T 0∗u . Fix a T ∗e satisfying
Proposition 2. First consider the market x = 0 and recall that T ∗u (0) = T 0∗u . Conditional on
a hire, a firm’s expected profit is then described by
Πu(0, T 0∗u ) =
Z T 0∗u
0
e−(λ+δ)spds =
p
λ+ δ
h
1− e−(λ+δ)T 0∗u
i
. (9)
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Note that if at market x = 0+ is optimal to set T , then at market x = 0 firms can always
deviate from T 0∗u by posting a contract T 0u = T and retain all the workers. Since firms hiring
unemployed workers have a constant hiring rate, (4) implies optimality of T 0∗u requires that
Πu(0, T 0∗u ) ≥ Πu(0, T ). However, at x = 0+ firms can still deviate by posting a contract
T 0
+
e = T 0∗u − ε, where ε > 0 is arbitrarily small, and attract workers with probability
one. Since Claim 4 implies Πe(0+, T ) = Πe(0+, T 0∗u − ε) for any ε > 0, by continuity
Πu(0, T 0∗u ) = Πu(0, T ) must hold in equilibrium.
CLAIM 5: Given a T ∗e satisfying Proposition 2, then
Πu(0, T 0u ) = Πu for all T
0
u ∈ [T , T 0∗u ].
Proof: See Appendix.
Furthermore, equilibrium requires that an unemployed worker with no experience must
be indiﬀerent to accept a T 0∗u contract. Otherwise, equations (4) and (9) imply firms could
increase steady state flow profits by oﬀering T 0∗u +ε, where ε > 0 is arbitrarily small. (8) then
implies U(0) = Vu(0, T 0∗u ) = b/δ, where Vu(0, T 0∗u ) is given by (7) at x = 0. Note that the
latter result and Claim 5 ensures that all starting oﬀers T 0u > T 0∗u are rejected by unemployed
workers (and so make zero profit), while excessively generous starting oﬀers, T 0u < T, yield
a lower profit.
Since equilibrium requires Ve(x, T ∗e (x)) > Vu(x, T 0∗u ) for all x ∈
¡
0, T 0∗u
¢
, an important
corollary of this condition is that T ∗e (0+) must satisfy Ve(0+, T ∗e (0+)) > b/δ. Using the
expression for Ve(s, T ∗e (s)) the following result guarantees that workers employed in a T 0∗u
contract quit to jobs oﬀering a T ∗e contract.
CLAIM 6: Given a T ∗e satisfying Proposition 2, a necessary condition for a market equi-
librium is that T ∗e (0) = T < T 2, where T 2 is defined by
T 2 = (1/δ) log(p/b).
22
Proof: See Appendix.
Note that these conditions uniquely determine T ∗e , and hence T
0∗
u , as the solution of (6)
that satisfies Vu(0, T 0∗u ) = b/δ subject to T < T 1 and T < T 2.
Given such a T ∗e , now consider a worker of experience 0 < x < T
0∗
u employed in contract
T 0∗u and let T < T 2. If this worker decided to quit into unemployment, firms would optimally
oﬀer a contract T ∗u (x) such that it extracts the entire match rents, Vu(x, T
∗
u (x)) = U(x). As
before, (4) implies firms have no incentive to improve this oﬀer since they have a constant
hiring rate and the worker accepts any contract that gives him at least U(x) and quit as soon
as a T ∗e contract arrives. As this is true for any experience, (8) implies T
∗
u (x) is determined by
Vu(x, T ∗u (x)) = U(x) = b/δ for all x > 0. Hence we have established the following Proposition.
PROPOSITION 3: Given a T ∗e satisfying Proposition 2, a necessary condition for a
market equilibrium is that outside oﬀers for unemployed workers, T ∗u (x), satisfy
p
δ
"
λ
Z T∗u (x)
x
e−(λ+δ)(s−x)e−δ(T
∗
e (s)−s)ds+ e−(λ+δ)(T
∗
u (x)−x)
#
=
b
δ
(10)
for all x ≥ 0.
Note that under such a T ∗u , no worker employed in a T
0∗
u quits into unemployment since
in equilibrium Vu(x, T 0∗u ) is strictly increasing in x < T
0∗
u .Moreover, given Vu(x, T
0∗
u ) > U(x)
for x > 0, Claim 6 implies this is also the case for a worker employed in a T ∗e (x) contract.
In equilibrium then µ(x) = 0 for x > 0 and firms’ expected steady state flow profits in the
unemployed workers’ market are given by Ωxu(T ∗u (x)) = Ω
x
u = 0 for all x > 0.
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8 Existence of a Market Equilibrium
We now consider existence of a market equilibrium. The next claim gives necessary and
suﬃcient conditions such that the definition of a market equilibrium is satisfied.
14 Note that firms can also obtain Ωxu = 0 with a contract Txu such that U(x) ∈ [b/δ, Vu(x, T 0∗u )). Conditional
on T < T 2, such a contract would imply no worker will quit into unemployment and firms would obtain
Ωxu(Txu ) = Ω
x
u.
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Figure 1: Existence of T ∗e .
CLAIM 7: Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a market equilibrium are:
(a) a function T ∗e such that (6) and
p
δ
"
λ
Z T 0∗u
0
e−(λ+δ)se−δ(T
∗
e (s)−s)ds+ e−(λ+δ)T
0∗
u
#
=
b
δ
, (11)
are simultaneously satisfied subject to T < T 1 and T < T 2.
(b) Given such a T ∗e , a function T ∗u such that (10) is satisfied for all x > 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
Existence of equilibrium can then be shown by solving Claim 7. Figure 1 shows the
conditions for existence of a T ∗e satisfying part (a) of Claim 7.15
In particular, the locus LG describes Vu(0, T 0∗u ) -the LHS of (11)- as a function of T .
Note that Vu(0, T 0∗u ) is continuous and strictly decreasing in T < T 1, since (6) implies T ∗e (x)
increases continuously with T for all x ∈ [0, T 0∗u ]. Let V denote the limit of Vu(0, T 0∗u ) as
T → T 1 and note that Vu(0, T 0∗u ) converges to J0(0) as T → 0. On the other hand, the locus
MG describes Ve(0, T ∗e (0)) as a function of T . Ve(0, T ∗e (0)) is also continuous and strictly
decreasing in T and converges to J0(0) as T → 0. Since T 0∗u > T > 0, Ve(0, T ∗e (0)) is
15 Note that (11) is just (10) at x = 0.
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strictly greater than Vu(0, T 0∗u ) for any given T ∈ (0, T 1). It then follows that for any value
of b/δ ∈ (V , J0(0)) there exists a unique T 0 satisfying T 0 < T 1 and T 0 < T 2 such that the
corresponding solution, T ∗0e , to (6) solves (11).
Given such a T ∗e , Claim 7 then requires that T ∗u (x) satisfies (10) for all x > 0. In what
follows lets consider T ∗u (x) > T 0∗u for all x > 0. As shown below, this ensures that T ∗u (x) > x
for all x ≤ T 0∗u . Hence, using (7), equation (10) can be expressed as
b
δ
= Vu(x, T 0∗u ) +
p
δ
∙
λ
λ+ δ
h
1− e−(λ+δ)(T∗u (x)−T 0∗u )
i
+ e−(λ+δ)(T
∗
u (x)−x) − e−(λ+δ)(T 0∗u −x)
¸
,
for all x > 0. Solving for T ∗u (x) we obtain
T ∗u (x) =
1
λ+ δ
lnΦ+ T 0∗u , where
Φ =
⎡
⎣
(p/δ)
³
e−(λ+δ)(T
0∗
u −x) − λλ+δ
´
(p/δ)
³
e−(λ+δ)(T 0∗u −x) − λλ+δ
´
− (Vu(x, T 0∗u )− (b/δ))
⎤
⎦ . (12)
It follows that T ∗u is uniquely determined if and only if Φ > 1 for all x > 0. However, as (6)
cannot be solved explicitly for T ∗e and Φ > 1 cannot be verified analytically, we must analyse
the model numerically to show existence of equilibrium.
Table 1 shows existence of T ∗e for several values of b and λ when p = 18 and δ =
0.0175.16,17 Note that Figure 1 implies for any b ∈ (δV , p), b and T ∗e are inversely related.
As b decreases (and U(0) decreases), firms at x = 0 market are able to attract unemployed
workers by oﬀering them a contract with a longer time-to-promotion period. Since poaching
firms at any market x > 0 will also increase their promotion dates, a decrease (increase) in
b shifts outwards (inwards) T ∗e for all x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ).
16 These parameter values are chosen only as an example. Existence is not resticted to these set of values.
However, the values of the transition parameter δ and λ are in line with the estimates of Sulis (2003) who
uses matched employer-employee data based on the Italian National Social Security Institute Administrative
Archives.
17 All the results presented in Table 1 are approximated to 2 decimal point. More accurate estimates are
availiable upon request.
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Similarly, when search frictions increase (λ gets smaller), equation (6) implies that dT ∗e /dx
decreases for all x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ) and promotion dates oﬀered by good jobs at positive experience
markets converge to the ones oﬀered by bad jobs; i.e. T ∗e (x) → T 0∗u for all x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ). On
the other hand, as frictions disappear T 1 decreases. This implies that T must also decrease.
At the same time workers hired in bad jobs have more opportunities to get a better job
before promotion, more markets open and hence T 0∗u increases. However, an increase in λ
also increases V and hence reduces the set of values of b for which T ∗e can exists. For values
of λ high enough there is no b < p such that T ∗e exists.18
For these set of parameters, the highlighted results in Table 1 shows the subset of pa-
rameters for which T ∗u (x) > T 0∗u for all x > 0 exists.19 Note that (12) implies Φ > 1 for all
x is satisfied if and only if
(p/δ)
³
e−(λ+δ)(T
0∗
u −x) − (λ/(λ+ δ))
´
> Vu(x, T 0∗u )− (b/δ) for all x > 0.
Table 1 shows this inequality is satisfied only when (p−b) and/or when (λ−δ) are suﬃciently
small. Otherwise, Φ becomes a decreasing function of x in the neighborhood of x = 0 until
it reaches zero at x = ex < T 0∗u , where it fails to exist. This implies T ∗u is decreasing in x < ex
and does not exist at ex. In terms of z∗u(x), the numerical solutions show that when T ∗u exists
the promotion tenure is increasing for low values of x and then decreases. Outside oﬀers for
unemployed workers worsen with experience at early stages and then improve.
Hence when p = 18 and δ = 0.0175 a market equilibrium exists for those parameters for
which both T ∗e and T ∗u exist. As an example, Figures 2 and 3 show the functions T ∗e and T ∗u
and Figure 4 shows the corresponding solutions for Vu(x, T 0∗u ) and Ve(x, T ∗e (x)) given U(x)
and J0(x) when b = 14 and λ = 0.02.
18 Given the values of b shown in Table 1, T ∗e fails to exist for the corresponding values of λ = 0.1, 0.12,
0.14, 0.16, 0.19, 0.23, 0.29, 0.4, 0.61 and 1.3.
19 Although not shown in Table 1, for b = 17.5 T ∗u also exists when λ = 0.09.
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Table 1: Existence of Equilibrium T ∗e and T
∗
u for p = 18, δ = 0.0175
b
λ 13 13.5 14 14.5 15 15.5 16 16.5 17 17.5
0.02 T ∗e (0) 15.50 14.00 12.45 10.93 9.40 7.80 6.28 4.70 3.16 1.58
T ∗u (0) 18.97 16.71 14.50 12.45 10.48 8.52 6.73 4.94 3.27 1.61
T 1 35.92 35.92 35.92 35.92 35.92 35.92 35.92 35.92 35.92 35.92
T 2 18.60 16.44 14.36 12.36 10.42 8.54 6.73 4.97 3.27 1.61
0.03 T ∗e (0) 14.38 13.05 11.74 10.38 8.98 7.56 6.10 4.62 3.10 1.57
T ∗u (0) 19.49 17.01 14.76 12.62 10.57 8.63 6.76 4.98 3.26 1.61
T 1 26.26 26.26 26.26 26.26 26.26 26.26 26.26 26.26 26.26 26.26
T 2 18.60 16.44 14.36 12.36 10.42 8.54 6.73 4.97 3.27 1.61
0.04 T ∗e (0) 13.40 12.27 11.10 9.87 8.60 7.28 5.92 4.52 3.05 1.56
T ∗u (0) 20.19 17.52 15.09 12.81 10.69 8.68 6.79 5.00 3.26 1.61
T 1 20.74 20.74 20.74 20.74 20.74 20.74 20.74 20.74 20.74 20.74
T 2 18.60 16.44 14.36 12.36 10.42 8.54 6.73 4.97 3.27 1.61
0.05 T ∗e (0) 12.55 11.55 10.52 9.40 8.25 7.03 5.75 4.42 3.00 1.54
T ∗u (0) 21.17 18.13 15.49 13.03 10.83 8.75 6.83 5.01 3.26 1.61
T 1 17.15 17.15 17.15 17.15 17.15 17.15 17.15 17.15 17.15 17.15
T 2 18.60 16.44 14.36 12.36 10.42 8.54 6.73 4.97 3.27 1.61
0.06 T ∗e (0) 11.79 10.93 10.00 9.00 7.94 6.80 5.60 4.33 2.96 1.53
T ∗u (0) 22.54 19.02 16.02 13.37 11.53 8.86 6.88 5.04 3.27 1.60
T 1 14.62 14.62 14.62 14.62 14.62 14.62 14.62 14.62 14.62 14.62
T 2 18.60 16.44 14.36 12.36 10.42 8.54 6.73 4.97 3.27 1.61
0.07 T ∗e (0) 11.10 10.35 9.52 8.62 7.65 6.59 5.45 4.24 2.93 1.52
T ∗u (0) 24.49 20.14 16.66 13.76 11.24 8.99 6.93 5.05 3.28 1.60
T 1 12.75 12.75 12.75 12.75 12.75 12.75 12.75 12.75 12.75 12.75
T 2 18.60 16.44 14.36 12.36 10.42 8.54 6.73 4.97 3.27 1.61
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Figure 2: Equilibrium T ∗e when p = 18, b = 14, λ = 0.02 and δ = 0.0175.
Before interpreting these results lets make a brief comparison with Stevens (2004). Recall
that in her framework firms are not able to contract upon workers’ initial experience nor
employment status. Equilibrium is characterised by a contract oﬀer distribution that is
degenerate at Ts, such that V (0, Ts) = U. This contract is oﬀered to all unemployed workers
and hence experience and tenure are equal in this case. Since an employed worker never
quits to a diﬀerent employer, the optimal promotion tenure (experience) in this framework
is given by
b
δ
= e−δTs
Z ∞
Ts
e−δ(t−Ts)pdt. (13)
Solving for Ts implies that Ts = T 2, where T 2 is described in Claim 6.
Now consider firms’ total steady state profit flows in both frameworks. Given that T < Ts,
Claim 5 implies firms’ steady state flow profits at the market of unemployed workers with
zero experience is lower than the one obtain in Stevens. However, by using experience to
segment markets between
¡
0, T 0∗u
¢
, firms are able to increase their total profits and match
that of Stevens. The following equations describe total steady state flow profits in both
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Figure 3: Equilibrium T ∗u when p = 18, b = 14, λ = 0.02 and δ = 0.0175.
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frameworks
Ωs =
λδ
(λ+ δ)
p
δ
h
1− e−δTs
i
,
Ω =
λδ
(λ+ δ)
p
δ
"
1−
Ã
λ
Z T 0∗u
0
e−(λ+δ)xe−δ(T
∗
e (x)−x)dx+ e−(λ+δ)T
0∗
u
!#
,
where Ωs denotes Stevens’ steady state profit flows. Noting (13) and (10) imply that in both
cases the second term inside the square brackets equals b/p, we obtain that Ω = Ωs.
Moreover, as in Stevens, the full information and oﬀer-matching case described by Postel-
Vinay and Robin (2002) imply firms extract the entire match rents from the worker when
agents are homogeneous. With full information and oﬀer-matching firms’ total steady state
profit flow is given by
ΩPV−R =
λ
δ + λ
(p− b).
It follows by inspection that in all three cases firms acheive equal total steady state flow
profits, Ω = Ωs = ΩPV−R.20
A similar result was obtained in Carrillo-Tudela (2004b). In that paper I extend a version
of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model by allowing firms to contract upon employment
status. Unemployed workers are oﬀered their reservation wage and firms obtain the same
profits as in Postel-Vinay and Robin homogenous agents case. This suggest that the equal
profit result is driven by the ability of firms to oﬀer unemployed workers contracts such
that they are indiﬀerent to accept them.21 In the cases of Stevens and Postel-Vinay and
Robin, firms extract the entire match rents with one contract. In the present case and as
in Carrillo-Tudela (2004b), firms are able to extract total match rents in several markets.
Although there is a positive probability a worker hired from unemployment might quit in
20 A crucial diﬀerence, however, is that in Postel-Vinay and Robin’s case workers are not liquidity constraint.
The reservation wage of unemployed workers is in fact negative. Imposing the liquidity constraint w = 0 would
reduce firms profits as they would not longer be able to extract the entire match rents from the workers.
21 Recall that contracts T 0∗u and Ts yield the same starting expected payoﬀ, b/δ.
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the future, firms compensate that loss by hiring employed workers of positive experience.
9 Interpretation and Conclusions
I argue that the framework derived in this paper is useful to understand wage variation within
a firm. Doeringer and Piore (1971) and Saint-Paul (1996) present evidence that firms seg-
ment the labour market internally oﬀering two types of jobs. In the upper tier of their labour
market firms create an internal labour market oﬀering high wages, employment stability and
promotions. The lower tier is characterised by low wages and a high degree of turnover.
Medoﬀ and Abraham (1980) and Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a) document a signif-
icant amount of wage variation both within and between a firm’s job levels for managerial
and professional categories.
The results suggest that search frictions alone can give an alternative explanation of why
this “dual” labour market might appear within a firm. In the model, profit maximising firms
exploit their monopsony power and oﬀer a low paying job to an unemployed worker with no
previous experience and a high paying one to an employed with positive experience because
it knows the former does not have an outside option while the latter does. This is in contrast
is the typical explanations based on eﬃciency wages and the existence of monitoring cost.
Moreover, Medoﬀ and Abraham (1980) show that wages among jobs of the same diﬃculty
are positively correlated with workers’ experience after controlling by tenure and productivity.
In the present paper, this result is solely determined by search frictions. As the experience-
earnings profile of workers hired under a T 0∗u contract increases steeply during the period
in which these workers earn less than p, firms at markets x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ) must oﬀer contracts
with increasing starting values if they are going to successfully recruit them before promotion
arrives.
Since more experienced workers are oﬀered contracts with higher starting values, the
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model predicts cohort eﬀects within a firm. The expected value of employment of two workers
hired at experiences x and x0 follow a common pattern that is independent of outside oﬀers.
Hence, much of the variation between cohorts’ expected value of employment implied by the
earnings distribution G (see Claim 2) comes from the diﬀerence in starting payoﬀ described
by V (x, T ∗e (x)) and persists until promotion arrives. Through simulations I have further
derived the impact of changes in market conditions on T ∗e and hence on how these cohort
eﬀects behave when frictions and the opportunity cost of employment change.
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994b) find some empirical support for this prediction.
Using personnel data of a mayor US corporation during the period 1969-1988 they find strong
evidence of cohort eﬀects that depend on the year in which workers where hired. In their
study, employee’s wages of diﬀerent cohorts follow a common pattern (increasing and convex
with tenure) and move in parallel. New entrant wages, however, follow a more idiosyncratic
and erratic path which is described by external market conditions. Not surprisingly, they
argue that these wage patterns are consistent with wage policies found in the incentive/agency
theory.
Furthermore, the theory present in this paper implies that inside a firm, holding tenure
constant, workers that where hired with more pre-company experience (experience gained
outside the firm) are higher in the earnings ladder and when controlling for experience work-
ers with more tenure have higher earnings. These predictions are also consistent with the
empirical findings of Medoﬀ and Abraham (1980). Their analysis shows that in both cases
for managerial and professional employees there exists positive returns to outside firm (pre-
company) experience and positive returns to tenure when controlling for tenure and expe-
rience, respectively. Interestingly, they find that these eﬀects explain nearly 40% of wage
diﬀerentials found within a job level.
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In conclusion, the results presented in this paper seem to suggest that allowing for more
complex firm wage policies in search equilibrium type of environments can proof useful to
further understand the interaction between search frictions and the worker’s wage pattern
inside the firm. The empirical evidence of Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a) and Lazear
(1995) indicates that the wage variation observed within a firm is not only influenced by
workers’ characteristics but also by external market forces. If search frictions are important
in shaping labour markets as recent empirical evidence suggest, there is a strong case to
further analysis the role search frictions play in determining a firm’s internal wage structure.
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Appendix
Proof of Claim 1:
For a given i = u, e, fix an x, an initial starting payoﬀ V xi ∈ [U(x), Jx(0)) and a profile
Fu(. | κ) and Fe(. | κ) for κ ≥ x.
(i) Suppose there exists a t0 > 0 such that V xi (t
0;wx∗i ) < U(x + t
0). In this case the worker
quits and the firm obtains a continuation payoﬀ of zero. However, this firm can retain
the worker and increase profits by oﬀering a constant wage contract wx+t
0
i (τ) = wε = p −
ε > b for all τ ≥ 0, where ε > 0 is suﬃciently small. In this case ε is chosen such that
(p/δ) − V x+t0i (0;wε) = β(ε) > 0, where β(ε) > 0 is suﬃciently small. Given p/δ > U(x)
for all x ≥ 0 there always exists a −neighborhood around p/δ, Λ(p/δ), such that U(x) /∈
Λ(p/δ) for all x. However, by choosing ε appropriately V x+t
0
i (τ ;wε) ∈ Λ(p/δ) such that
(p/δ) > V x+t
0
i (τ ;wε) > U(x + t
0 + τ) for all τ ≥ 0. Hence the worker does not quit into
unemployment while the firm is able to makes strictly positive profits. Since continuity
implies such a contract always exists, the above argument contradicts the optimality of the
original contract and V xi (t;w
x∗
i ) ≥ U(x+ t) for all x, t ≥ 0.
(ii) Next, suppose there exists a tenure t0 > 0 such that V xi (t
0;wx∗i ) > J
x(t0). Since V xi (0;w
x∗
i ) <
Jx(0) and V xi (.;w
x∗
i ) is continuous over t there exists an s ∈ (0, t0) such that V xi (s;wx∗i ) =
Jx(s). However, at that tenure the optimal contract implies wxi (t) = p for all t ≥ s and
therefore V xi (.;w
x∗
i ) = J
x(.) for all t ≥ s contradicting the optimality of wx∗i . k
Proof of Proposition 1:
For any employment status i = u, e and initial experience x fix a V xi ∈ [U(x), Jx(0)) and
a profile Fe(. | κ) for κ ≥ x. Consider the following step-contract, wzxi ,
wzxi (t) = w for t < z,
wzxi (t) = p for t ≥ z;
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where z is chosen such that V xi (0;w
zx
i ) = V
x
i . Note that V
x
i (t;w
zx
i ) = J
x(t) for t ≥ z and (2)
implies V xi (t;w
zx
i ) solves
δV xi (t;w
zx
i ) = w + V˙
x
i (t;w
zx
i ) + λϕe(V
x
i (t;w
zx
i ) ;x+ t), (14)
for all t < z, where
ϕe(V
x
i (t) ;x+ t) ≡
Z V x+te
V xi (t)
[V x+te − V xi (t)]dFe(V x+te | x+ t)
denotes the “surplus function” for any market x+ t and is continuous and non increasing in
V xi (t) ∈ [U(x+ t), Jx(t)].
Step 1: I will show that (i) the step-contract wzxi has a unique starting payoﬀ V
x
i (0;w
zx
i );
and (ii) V xi (0;w
zx
i ) is strictly decreasing in z. Let the step-contracts, w
zx
i and w
ezx
i , be such
that the promotion tenure ez = z + ε for any ε > 0.
(i) Suppose that V xi (0;w
zx
i ) = V
x
i (0;w
ezx
i ). Using (14) it follows that V˙
x
i (0;w
zx
i ) =
V˙ xi (0;w
ezx
i ). Continuity then implies V˙
x
i (t;w
zx
i ) = V˙
x
i (t;w
ezx
i ) for all t ∈ (0, z] and hence
V xi (z;w
zx
i ) = J
x(z) = V xi (z;w
ezx
i ). However, w
ezx
i implies V
x
i (t;w
ezx
i ) < J
x(t) for all t ∈ [0, ez)
and V xi (t;w
ezx
i ) = J
x(t) at t = ez. Hence V xi (0;wzxi ) 6= V xi (0;wezxi ).
(ii) Now suppose that V xi (0;w
zx
i ) < V
x
i (0;w
ezx
i ). Since V
x
i (z;w
zx
i ) > V
x
i (z;w
ezx
i ), continuity
implies that there exists a t´ ∈ [0, z) such that V xi (t0;wzxi ) = V xi (t0;wezxi ). Using the same
arguments as in (i) we have V xi (t;w
zx
i ) = V
x
i (t;w
ezx
i ) for all t ∈ (t´, z]. Hence V xi (0;wzxi ) >
V xi (0;w
ezx
i ).
Note that as z = 0 implies V xi (0;w
zx
i ) = J
x(0), any z > 0 must then correspond
to a V xi (0;w
zx
i ) < J
x(0). Using (i) and (ii), continuity then implies that for each V xi ∈
[U(x), Jx(0)], there exists a unique step-contract with corresponding promotion tenure z ≥ 0.
Step 2: Let ewxi denote any other contract such that V xi (0; ewxi ) = V xi . Subtracting the corre-
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sponding continuation payoﬀs we obtain
V˙ xi (t;w
zx
i )− V˙ xi (t; ewxi ) = ewxi (t)− w + δ[V xi (t;wzxi )− V xi (t; ewxi )] (15)
−λ[ϕe(V xi (t;wzxi );x+ t)− ϕe(V xi (t; ewxi );x+ t)];
for all t < z. Since V xi = V
x
i (0;w
zx
i ) = V
x
i (0; ewxi ) by assumption, it follows that V˙ xi (0;wzxi ) ≥
V˙ xi (0; ewxi ). Continuity of V xi (.) and the properties of ϕe then imply V˙ xi (t;wzxi ) ≥ V˙ xi (t; ewxi )
and V xi (t;w
zx
i ) ≥ V xi (t; ewxi ) for all t < z. Furthermore, as V xi (t;wzxi ) = Jx(t) for all t ≥ z, it
follows that V xi (t;w
zx
i ) ≥ V xi (t; ewxi ) for all t ≥ 0.
Step 3: Let Jmxi (0;w
x
i ) = V
x
i (0;w
x
i )+Π
x
i (0;w
x
i ) denote the total expected value of the match
and note that Jx(0) ≥ Jmxi (0;wxi ) as Jx denote the maximum expected value of a match.
Let Πxi (t;w
x
i ) denote the continuation payoﬀ of a firm oﬀering w
x
i such that
δΠxi (t;w
x
i ) = p− wxi (t) +
dΠxi (t;w
x
i )
dt
− λ(1− Fe(V xi (t;wxi ) | x+ t)Πxi (t;wxi ) (16)
Since the objective of a firm is to chose a wxi to maximise Π
x
i (0;w
x
i ) subject to V
x
i (0;w
x
i ) =
V xi , the problem is equivalent to chose a w
x
i such that it maximises J
mx
i (0;w
x
i ).
Consider the step-contract wzxi and a contract ewxi . It follows that Jmxi (t;wzxi ) = Jx(t) ≥
Jmxi (t; ewxi ) for all t ≥ z, where (14) and (16) characterise Jmxi (t;wxi ). Subtracting the corre-
sponding Jmxi for w
zx
i and ewxi and using the results of Step 2 we obtain that
[J˙mxi (t; ewxi )− J˙mxi (t;wzxi )] ≥ (δ + λ(1− Fe(V xi (t;wzxi ) | x+ t))[Jmxi (t; ewxi )− Jmxi (t;wzxi )]
for all t ≥ 0. Since Jmxi (t;wzxi ) ≥ Jmxi (t; ewxi ) at t = z, continuity implies Jmxi (0;wzxi ) ≥
Jmxi (0; ewxi ). Hence, conditional on V xi (0; ewxi ) = V xi (0;wzxi ) = V xi ∈ [U(x), Jx(0)), it follows
that Πxi (0;w
zx
i ) ≥ Πxi (0; ewxi ).k
Proof of Claim 2:
Consider first T 0∗u . As all starting oﬀers imply T 0∗u then 1 −G(T 0∗u | 0) = 1. Further, as
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T ∗e < T 0∗u for x > 0, then conditional on remaining in the labour market, workers quit to
T ∗e < T 0∗u at rate λ. Hence 1−G(T 0∗u | x) = e−λx for 0 < x < T 0∗u .
Now fix a x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ) and a T xe ∈ (T , T 0∗u ). Define κ where T ∗e (κ) = T xe . If x < κ, then
all oﬀers T ∗e (s) < T xe for all experiences s ∈ [0, x], and so ∂G/∂T xe = 0. It then follows from
the first part of the proof that 1−G(T xe | x) = e−λx.
Suppose instead x > κ. Steady state turnover implies for dx arbitrarily small
G(T ∗e (κ+ dx) | x)−G(T ∗e (κ) | x) = λdx[1−G(T ∗e (κ+ dx) | κ)] +O(dx2),
where conditional on remaining in the labour market, the proportion of workers on contract
T xe ∈ [T ∗e (κ), T ∗e (κ + dx)] at experience x are those who at experience κ and on contract
T 0∗u received an outside oﬀer and so quit to a contract T κe ∈ [T ∗e (κ), T ∗e (κ + dx)]. But at
experience κ, 1 − G(T ∗e (κ + dx), κ) = e−λκ. Dividing by dx and taking the limit dx → 0
implies the condition stated in the Claim.
Finally, note that A1 implies that workers under contracts no greater than T ∗e (κ) will
never quit to an outside oﬀer and that at experience κ, G(T ∗e (κ), κ) = 1− e−λκ. Hence, con-
ditional on those workers remaining in the labour market at experience x, 1−G(T ∗e (κ), x) =
e−λκ. k
Proof of Claim 4:
First consider T xe > T ∗e (x). Then
sign[
∂Ωxe
∂T xe
] = sign[e−λxe−(λ+δ)(κ−x)
h
−λp
δ
h
1− e−δ(Txe −κ)
i
+ [dT ∗e (κ)/dx] pe
−δ(Txe −κ)
i
].
Substituting out dT ∗e (κ)/dx from (6) and using Proposition 2 implies the first part of the
claim.
Now consider T xe < T ∗e (x),and so
sign[
∂Ωxe
∂T xe
] = sign[−λp
δ
h
1− e−δ(Txe −x)
i
+ [dT ∗e (κ)/dx] pe
−δ(Txe −x)].
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Substituting out dT ∗e (κ)/dx gives
sign[
∂Ωxe
∂T xe
] = sign[−λp
δ
h
1− e−δ(Txe −x)
i
+ λ
p
δ
h
eδ(T
x
e −κ) − 1
i
e−δ(T
x
e −x)].
sign[
∂Ωxe
∂T xe
] = sign[λ
p
δ
[−1 + e−δ(κ−x)]] > 0
as κ < x. k
Proof of Claim 5:
Fix x = 0. Suppose a firm oﬀers a contract T 0u ∈ [T , T 0∗u ] to an unemployed worker with
no experience. Define κ where T 0u = T ∗e (κ) such that T ∗e satisfies Proposition 2. Conditional
on a hire, the firm makes expected profit
Πu(0, T 0u ) =
p
λ+ δ
h
1− e−(λ+δ)κ
i
+ e−(λ+δ)κ
p
δ
h
1− e−δ(T 0u−κ)
i
as the worker quits for experience s < κ, does not quit thereafter, and the firm makes zero
profits for experiences s > T 0u . Diﬀerentiating the above equation with respect to T 0u yields
∂Πu(0, T 0u )
∂T 0u
= e−(λ+δ)κ
⎡
⎣−λ
δ
p
h
1− e−δ(T 0u−κ)
i
dT ∗e (κ)/dx
+ pe−δ(T
0
u−κ)
⎤
⎦ .
Using (6) to substitute out dT ∗e (κ)/dx such that T ∗e satisfies Proposition 2 leads to ∂Πu(0, T 0u )/∂T 0u =
0 which implies the condition stated in the claim.k
Proof of Claim 6:
Recall Ve(x, T ∗e (x)) = (p/δ)e−δ(T
∗
e (x)−x) and Vu(0, T 0∗u ) = b/δ. Since both Vu(x, T 0∗u ) and
Ve(x, T ∗e (x)) are increasing in x and converge to p/δ as x → T 0∗u , continuity implies that a
necessary condition for equilibrium is that
Ve(0, T ∗e (0)) = (p/δ)e
−δT∗e (0) > b/δ = Vu(0, T 0∗u ).
Otherwise workers employed in a T 0∗u contract will not quit to jobs oﬀering a T ∗e contract.
For this inequality to hold, T ∗e (0) = T < T 2, where T 2 is such that (p/δ)e−δT2 = b/δ. Solving
for T 2 implies the condition stated in the claim.k
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Proof of Claim 7:
Necessary: Proposition 2 implies that a necessary condition for A1 to be satisfied in a
market equilibrium such that the outside oﬀers of employed workers with experience x ∈¡
0, T 0∗u
¢
are optimal is that T ∗e describes the solution of (6) subject to T < T 1. Moreover,
optimality of T 0∗u implies equilibrium requires Vu(0, T 0∗u ) = U(0). Using (7) and (8) we obtain
that such a T ∗e must also satisfy
Vu(0, T 0∗u ) =
p
δ
"
λ
Z T 0∗u
0
e−(λ+δ)se−δ(T
∗
e (s)−s)ds+ e−(λ+δ)T
0∗
u
#
=
b
δ
= U(0).
Optimal worker turnover then implies Claim 6 must be satisfied and hence T ∗e must also be
solve subject to T < T 2. Conditional on such a T ∗e and on an unemployed worker of positive
experience, optimality of outside oﬀers for unemployed workers requires that T ∗u must satisfy
Proposition 3 and U(x) = b/δ for all x > 0.
Suﬃcient: Now consider a T ∗e and T ∗u such that Proposition 2, Claim 6 and Proposition
3 are simultaneously satisfied. Claim 4 implies firms will not have the incentive to oﬀer a
T xe ∈ (T , T ∗e (x)) and a T xe ∈ (T ∗e (x), T 0∗u ) at any experience market x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ). Moreover,
no firm will oﬀer a T xe > T 0∗u at experience market x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ) as no worker will accept
the oﬀer. Claim 5 and the fact that unemployed workers of zero experience will reject any
contract T 0u with Vu(0, T 0u ) < U(0) imply that no firm will oﬀer a T 0u > T 0∗u or a T 0u < T.
Finally, conditional on an unemployed worker of positive experience x ∈ (0, T 0∗u ], firms will
not have incentives to deviate from oﬀering T ∗u (x) as a T xu < T ∗u (x) will imply less profits
and unemployed workers will reject a T xu > T ∗u (x). k
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